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INTRODUCTION
Large scale international trade needs, in addition to other
favorable conditions, a certain measure of security and predicta-
bility with regard to the enforcement of obligations. 2 The very
fact, however, that a commercial transaction is connected with
more than one legal system creates an uncertainty as to the exist-
ence, size, and content of obligations. Due to the diversity and
"contrariety"3 of the law prevailing in various parts of the
world, an interested party may not readily ascertain the place
where a potential dispute can be settled, the governing substan-
tive law (since that choice will depend to a large extent on the
forum), and whether a judgment obtained in one country can
be enforced in another country.4
Traditionally, such problems arising in transactions involv-
ing multiple contacts have been dealt with by resorting to rules
of conflict of laws.5 The function of conflict of law rules is to
refer a given dispute to a definite legal system in accordance
with a variety of contacts considered significant for the legal
relation in question.6 In commercial transactions the parties
*Research Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULES
RELATING TO BILLS OF LADING, LEAGUE OF NATIONS, TREATY SERIES 17 (1931).
I 2. See 2 RADEL, CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 407, 429 (1947) ;
Id., Conflict Rules on Contracts, in CONFLICT OF LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL CON-
TRACTS 127 (1949).
3. See LIVERMORE, DISSERTATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS WHICH ARISE FROM THE
CONTRARIETY OF THE POSITIVE LAWS (1820) ; St6dter, Zur Statutenkollision in
Seefrachtvertrag, in LiBER AMICORUM OF CONGRATULATIONS TO ALGOT BAGGE 220,
221 (1955).
4. See EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1 (1959). Cf. Matteucci, Unification
of Conflicts Rules in Relation to International Unification of Private Law, in
CONFLICT OF LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 150, 151 (1949).
5. Cf. Matteucci, supra note 4, at 151. A conflicts rule furnishes a test for
determining which of several possibly applicable laws shall be applied to the case
in hand. See Morris, The Choice of Law Clauses in Statutes, 62 L.Q. REV. 170,
172 (1946) ; EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1.
6. See NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1943);
STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1 (1951).
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ordinarily enjoy a large measure of autonomy 7 and thus they
may, by selecting the proper contacts, subject their relations to
a desired legal system which will eventually furnish the sub-
stantive rule of decision.
8
While the conflicts method secures a minimum of certainty,
several drawbacks are apparent. Ordinarily, it presupposes a
thorough familiarity with a number of legal systems both with
regard to substantive law and conflict of law rules.9 Further, the
conflict of law rules prevailing in various countries are not gen-
erally accepted and uniform provisions of public international
law,10 but "national" rules which may differ from country to
country." Thus, resort to choice of law is conducive to certainty
only after the forum itself is known.12
Beginning with the last years of the past century, a new
method started to take shape as it became increasingly apparent
that a higher measure of certainty and predictability could be
achieved by making uniform, first, the conflicts rules, and then,
the substantive law prevailing in various parts of the world.' 3
While such uniformity may be achieved in several ways,'4 adop-
7. See Levin, Party Autonomy: Choice of Law Clauses in Commercial Con-
tracts, 46 GEO. L.J. 260 (1957) ; Stbdter, supra note 3, at 229, 230.
8. See in general, Neumayer, Autonomic de la volontd et dispositions impdra-
tives en droit international privd des obligations, [1957] REv. CR. DR. INT. PR.
579 et seq.; Batiffol, Public Policy and the Autonomy of the Parties: Interrela-
tions Between Imperative Legislation and the Doctrine of Party Autonomy, in
CONFLICT OF LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 68 (1949) ; Levin, Party
Autonomy: Choice of Law Clauses in Commercial Contracts, 46 GEO. L.J. 260
(1957).
9. See Hamel, Perspectives et limites de l'unification du droit privd, [1951)
II L'UNIFICATION DU DROIT 60; text at notes 64-65 infra.
10. See 1 BARTIN, PRINCIPES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIvit 74 et seq. (1930)
NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (1943). But cf. DE
NAUROIS, LES TRAITS INTERNATIONAUX DEVANT LES JURISDICTIONS NATIONALES
58 (1934) ("international law"). See also 2 SCELLE, PRiCIS DE DROIT DES GENS
320 et seq. (1932) (conflicts rules determine the "legislative jurisdiction" of na-
tions, and rest on a customary rule of public international law permitting the
practice). But of. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 72 (1949), airing all possible doubts.
11. See 1 BARTIN, PRINCIPES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIV] 74 et seq. (1930)
Matteucci, supra note 4, at 152; JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND 51
(1958) ; WESTLAKE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1925) ; CHESHIRE, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1957). See also Chauveau, Des conventions portant loi
uniforme, [1956] CLUNETr 570, 575. But cf. SCELLE, op. cit. supra note 10, at
320 et seq.
12. See Matteucci, supra note 4, at 152. Certainty may be deceptive in case
of frequent reference to notions of public policy. Ibid. See also Oliver, Standardi-
zation of Choice of Law Rules for International Contracts: Should there be a new
beginning?, 53 AM. J. INT. L. 385, 386 (1959).
13. See BARTIN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 86; SCHERRER, ZUR FRAGE DEE IN-
TERNATIONALEN VEREINHEITLICHUNG DES PRIVATRECHTS 17 (1939).
14. See Chauveau, supra note 11, at 573. And in general, SCHERRER, op. cit.
supra note 13, at 20 et seq.; SCHNITZER, DR LA DIVERSITt ET DE L'UNIFICATION
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tion of international conventions incorporating the rules intend-
ed to become uniform in all of the contracting states emerged as,
perhaps, the most important method. 15
The contract for the carriage of goods (affreightment) by
sea-going vessels under bills of lading was one of the first areas
of commercial law to attract attention for possible unification of
law.16 Actually, unification of law in that area was more than
simply desirable; it was virtually necessary due, on the one hand,
to the great importance of maritime transportation for the econ-
omy of several countries and the world trade in general, and, on
the other hand, due to a sharp conflict among national regula-
tions of the contract of affreightment and the liabilities of sea-
carriers under bills of lading.'7 A brief look to the practices pre-
vailing at the end of the past century discloses the disturbing
fact that the world was divided in carriers' countries and ship-
pers' countries. In some countries cargo interests had prevailed
and strict liability had been imposed on sea-carriers for loss or
damage to the goods carried; in other countries hull interests had
prevailed and the sea-carriers enjoyed an almost unlimited "free-
dom of contracting."' 8 Further, the national policy favoring the
shipper or the carrier was frequently brought into the field of
conflict of laws by the adoption of choice of law rules designed
to safeguard the application of the national law and its stand-
ards to bills of lading involving international contacts. 9 The
liabilities of the parties thus differed with the standards applied
by a fortuitous or selected forum, and as a result, security in
international bills of lading was minimized, the negotiability of
such instruments was imperilled, and world trade was seriously
hampered. 20 The remedy was thought to be in a uniform inter-
national regulation of bills of lading,2' and after several decades
nu DROIT 20 et seq. (1946) ; Matteucci, Les m6thodes de l'unification du droit,
[1956] II L'UNIFICATION DF DROIT 2 et seq.; Batiffol, Conflict Avoidance in
European Law, 21 LAW & CoNTEm '. PROB. 571 (1956); Lederman, Conflict
Avoidance by International Agreement, 21 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 581
(1956).
15. Of. Matteucei, supra note 4; Demogue, L'unification internationale de
droit privd [1927] REv. DR. INT. 699, 722; Chauveau, supra note 11, at 575.
16. Of. Matteucci, supra note 4, at 154.
17. See Yiannopoulos, Bills of Lading and the Conflict of Laws: Validity of
"Negligence" Clauses in France, 7 AM. J. CoMp. L. 516 (1958).
18. See KNAUTH, THE AMERICAN LAW OF OCEAN BILLS OF LADING 119 (here-
inafter Knauth) ; COLE, THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT 11 (1937).
19. See 1 RIPERT, DROIT MARITIME 255 (1952) ; Yiannopoulos, supra note 17,
at 516, n. 4.
20. See KNAUTH 120; ASTLE, SHIPOWNERS' CARGO LIABILITIES AND IMMUNI-
TIES 7 (1951).
21. See KNAUTH 124.
1961]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
of preparatory work by international institutions and business
organizations, the movement for unification culminated in an
international Convention for the Unification of certain Rules of
Law relating to Bills of Lading, signed at Brussels, on August
25, 1924.22
The purpose of the Brussels Convention was to standardize
on the international level the liabilities of the carriers so that
the outcome of a possible litigation would be the same in the
courts of any of the contracting states. 23 Whether the Brussels
Convention fulfilled its purpose, and to what extent, remains
still to be seen; the present paper has a much more limited scope.
In the following discussion is an effort at ascertaining - in the
light of the general theory concerning conventions for uniform
law -the juridical nature of the Brussels Convention and the
scope of the intended unification of law. Then, in a forthcoming
paper, the effects of unification will be considered in the light
of legislative and judicial practice in all contracting states.
DOCTRINAL OBSERVATIONS IN GENERAL
Conventions for uniform law, 24 representing a relatively new
development in the field of international relations, involve com-
plex issues which, in absence of authoritative determination by
international agencies, cannot be always resolved with certainty.
Reliance on secondary authorities 25 is the only avenue of ap-
22. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS, TREATY SERIES 17 (1931).
23. See KNAUTH 136; Yiannopoulos, supra note 17, at 518.
24. International agreements assume various forms and are given various
descriptive designations such as treaties, conventions, acts, etc. The term treaty
is usually employed in formal agreements of a political or quasi political char-
acter, and applies, ordinarily but not exclusively, to agreements on important
objects other than the establishment of rules of law. The term convention applies
frequently where there is an attempt at establishing rules of law (Hague Con-
ventions, Geneva Conventions). Treaties and conventions do not differ as regards
their structure, preambles, and their concluding articles with reference to ratifica-
tion and denouncement. The two terms are very frequently used indiscriminately.
See 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-3 (1943).
25. On conventions for uniform law, see Matteucci, Les mdthodes de l'unifica-
tion du droit, [19561 II L'UNIFICATION Du DROIT 2 et seq.; id., Unificazione
internationale del diritto private, XII 2 Nuovo DIGESTO ITALIANO 694 (1940);
Gutteridge, The Technique of the Unification of Private Law, [1939] BR. YRRK.
OF INT. L. 37; Hamel, Perspectives et limites de l'unification du droit privd
[1951] II L'UNIFICATION nu DROIT 61; Vallindas, Uniformitd d'interprdtation
des conventions de droit international privd, [1932] REV. DR. INT. PR. 727; Id.,
Autonomy of International Uniform Law, [1955] REV. HELL. DR. INT. 8; Mann,
The Interpretation of Uniform Statutes, 62 L.Q. REV. 278 (1946) ; Drion, Vers
une interpretation uniforme des Conventions du droit adrien privd, [1953] REV.
D. AlRIEN 299; Limpens, Les constantes de l'unification du droit priv6, [1958]
REV. INT. DR. COMP. 277 et seq.; Sarfati, Comparative Law and the Unification
of Law, 26 TUL. L. REV. 317 (1952) ; PLAISANT, TRAIT]t DE DROIT CONV.NTIONIUL
[Vol. XXI
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proach, though it may frequently lead to controversial assertions.
For the purpose of the following discussion, relevant issues are
only those concerning the binding force of international conven-
tions on contracting states, courts, and individuals, the juridical
nature of the rules contained in international conventions, and
the problem of the scope of unification.
Binding Force of International Conventions
International conventions for uniform law produce effects
which should be measured in the light of both international and
domestic law. Indeed, as it will be shown, conventions for uni-
form law function in two distinct fields, and much of confused
discussion in the legal literature is due to the fact that distinction
between international and municipal effects of conventions is not
always made.26
It is a well-established proposition of international law that
properly concluded and ratified27 conventions for uniform law
create an international obligation for the contracting states to
give effect to the rules agreed upon as rules of law within their
territories;28 and, in case this obligation is not properly dis-
INTERNATIONAL CONCERNANT LA PRORItTL INDUSTRIELLE (1949) ; Chauveau, Des
conventions portant loi uniforme, [1956] CLUNET 590; Bayer, Auslegung und
Ergdnzung International Vereinheitlicher Normen durch Staatliche Gerichte, 20
RABEL'S Z. 603 (1955) ; and in general, L'UNIFICATION nu DROIT, AFERgU
GtNtRAL DES TRAVAUX POUR L'UNIFICATION DU DROIT PRIVt (PROJETS ET CONVEN-
TIONS) (Rome, 1948-1959).
26. See Riesenfeld, The Power of Congress and the President in International
Relations: Three Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 643, 648
(1937).
27. The question of "valid" conclusion and ratification of international con-
ventions may involve issues of both international and domestic law. In general,
with regard to the binding effect of conventions so far as the international sphere
is concerned, the answer can only be given by the rules of international law. Cf.
Riesenfeld, supra note 26, at 649. However, the effect of constitutional provisions
upon the international validity of conventions is controversial. See RESEARCH IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, Part III, Comments to Art. 21
(1935). The prevailing view is that international law "relegates" certain issues
to national constitutions. See VERDROSS, VRL-ERRECHT 101 (1959) ; ROUSSEAU,
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 26 (1953).
28. See 1 GUGGENHEIm, TRAITII DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 28 (1953);
VERDROSS, op. cit. supra note 27, at 127; ROUSSEAU, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
APPROFONDI 56 (1958); Hamel, Perspectives et limites de l'unification du droit
priv6, [19511 II UNICATION DU DROIT 61; Chauveau, Des conventions portant
loi uniform, [1956] CLUNET 575; COLLIARD, INSTITUTIONS INTERNATIONALES 225
(1956). This obligation may be express (statement in the text of the convention
itself) or implied (by signing, ratifying, or adhering to the convention). See
Chauveau, supra; Vallindas, General Principles of Law and the Hierarchy of the
Sources of International Law, in FESTSCHRIFT SPIROPOULOS 424 (1957). There
is no general agreement, however, as to the time that the obligation attaches. Cf.
1 OPPENnEIM-LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 813 (1948).
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charged, international responsibility may attach. 2 The specific
content of this international obligation ordinarily depends on the
provisions of the convention itself.
Thus, conventions for uniform law, quite frequently, contain
provisions concerning the method to be followed by the contract-
ing states in giving effect to the rules adopted therein. The uni-
form rules may be appended in a schedule, with an attendant
obligation that they shall be given effect in the same form as
adopted, or provision may be made for their incorporation in a
form appropriate to the national legislation of the contracting
states. Further, provision may be made with regard to the scope
of unification and the area of application of the uniform rules.
In all these cases the contracting states undertake an interna-
tional obligation, which may be express or implied, to comply
with the provisions of the convention. In case no such provisions
are made, a proper interpretation of the convention in the light
of international practice might furnish conclusions with regard
to the scope of the obligations assumed by the contracting states.
Ordinarily, international conventions contain also provisions
setting out the requirements for their becoming effective and
binding upon the signatory countries. A usual provision to that
effect is one providing that the convention shall become effective
upon the lapse of a certain period of time following the deposi-
tion of a stated number of ratifications. 0 In absence of such
provision, or other indication, it seems that conventions become
binding on the contracting states upon their individual exchange
of ratifications. 81
Ratification is usually a voluntary state act; by signing an
international convention a state does not assume by implication
the obligation to ratify the same. Only in exceptional cases, and
according to an express intention of the contracting states, is the
customary requirement of ratification waived. 82 In such a case,
a convention may produce its international effects and become
29. See GUGGENhEIM, Op. cit. supra note 28, at 32; GOULD, AN INTRODUCTION
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 332 (1957); OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, op. cit. supra
note 28, at 305, 307, 325. "The comprehensive notion of international delinquency
ranges from ordinary breaches of treaty obligations."
30. Cf. Brussels Convention, art. XI; Id. art. XIV: "The present convention
shall take effect, in the case of the States which have taken part in the first
deposit of ratification, one year after the date of the protocol recording such
deposit."
31. Cf. 1 SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 435 et seq. (1957).
32. See RousSEAu, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC APPROFONDI 30-34 (1958);
GOULD, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 309-310 (1957) ; SCHWABZEN-
BEROGER, loj. cit. supra note 31.
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binding on the contracting states upon the realization of any
other attached condition, without the need of ratification.
At this point, the question may be raised whether interna-
tional conventions for uniform law become binding on courts and
individuals in the contracting states by virtue of ratification and
by direct operation of international law. The question is neces-
sarily connected with the broader issue of the relation between
international and municipal law. And it is precisely in this field
that a controversy is raging among theoreticians of international
law. According to the so-called monistic doctrine, international
law (both customary and conventional) is applicable in national
courts "as such" and by its own force.8 3 On the other hand,
according to the prevailing so-called dualistic doctrine, interna-
tional law is applicable in national courts only by virtue of a
constitutional, statutory, or customary rule of domestic law.3 4
Thus, international law becomes applicable only after its "trans-
formation" by virtue of a domestic rule of incorporation.
The juridical nature of conventions for uniform law is con-
troversial. 5 According to the prevailing opinion among scholars,
such conventions do not establish rules of international law. But
even if that were the case, we could conclude on the basis of the
prevailing doctrine in international law that conventions for uni-
form law are not as such applicable to private relations; courts
and individuals are bound only by their national laws, and con-
ventions become binding on them only insofar as they have been
transformed into domestic law by virtue of some domestic rule.
However, it should be noticed that in recent international prac-
tice exceptions are known whereby conventions may become
binding on courts and individuals by virtue of ratification
alone;86 such exceptions are ordinarily based on an express
undertaking by the contracting states.
33. See KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 403 et seq. (1952) ; id.,
Th6orie g6n~rale du droit international public, [1932] IV A.D.I.R.C. 119 et seq.;
VERDROSS, V6LKERRECHT 60 et seq. (1950) ; Papalambrou, Le probldme de la
"transformation" et la question de la validitM des actes 6tatiques "contraires" au
droit international, [1950] REv. HELL. DR. INT. 234.
34. See TRIEPFL, V6LKERRE HT UND LANDESREONT (1899) ; id., Les rapports
entre le droit interne et le droit international, [1923] A.D.I.R.C. 77-121; ANzI-
LOTTI, CORSO DI Dn iTTo INTERNAZIONALE (1934); WALZ, VOLKERRECUT UND
STAATLICHES RECHT (1933) ; Id., Les rapports du droit international et du droit
interne, [1937] III A.D.I.R.C. 379-456; 1 STRUPP, tLtMENTS DU DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL PUBLIC 19 et seq. (1930). Cf. ROUSSF_&U, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIO
APPROFONDI 1 et seq. (1958).
35. See text at note 44 et seq., infra.
36. See DAUM, VOLKERRECHT 53 et seq., 411418 (1958). Of. ROUSSEAU, op.
cit. supra note 34, at 63; VERDROSS, op. cit. supra note 33, at 60, 127.
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As international conventions are not ordinarily binding on
courts and individuals in the contracting states by virtue of in-
ternational law, their municipal effects necessarily depend on the
law of each state. Ordinarily, constitutional provisions establish
the procedures according to which conventions may become part
of the law of the land.8
7
According to some constitutions, properly signed and ratified
conventions are as such part of the law of the land. 5 Judicial
practice and doctrine, however, tend to construe such provisions
narrowly, and distinction is ordinarily drawn between self-
executing conventions and conventions which involve additional
legislation. The former are rendered directly applicable in na-
tional courts by mere ratification and as soon as they become
internationally effective; the latter are given the force of law in
the domestic sphere by virtue of implementing legislation. The
problem thus arises as to which conventions are self-executing.
The answer ordinarily depends on constitutional interpretation
and on the intention of the contracting states, namely, whether
an agreement was made which by its terms was to operate di-
rectly on private relations or an engagement was undertaken to
enact the appropriate legislation.
39
Other constitutions, however, provide that conventions, with-
out distinction, are rendered applicable in municipal courts only
after their "execution" by special statute or ordinance, 40 or even
after their enactment into law in accordance with the usual
37. Constitutional provisions can be found in U. N. Leg. Ser. No. 3 and in
PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS I-III (1950). Cf. notes 38, 40-41, infra.
38. See e.g., Article VI (2) of the United States Constitution; Article 11.3 of
the Swiss Constitution. Cf. Article 55 of the French Constitution of Oct. 4, 1958;
Article 49 (1) of the Austrian Constitution. See also Riesenfeld, supra note 26,
at 650 (United States) ; Rice, The Position of International Treaties in Swiss
Law, 46 Am. J. INT. L. 641 (1952) (Switzerland). Cf. Dehaussy, Les conditions
d'application des normes conventionnelles sur le for interne franvais, [1960]
CLUNET 702; note 40 infra.
39. See Riesenfeld, supra note 26, at 650. Cf. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion
in Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) ; German B.G.J1. June 21,
1955, 18 B.G.H.Z. 22, 26: "The provisions of an international convention may
apply directly in favor of individuals only where their content, purpose, and
method of execution leaves no doubt that such a function was intended."
40. Cf. Dehaussy, Les conditions d'application des normes conventionnelles sur
le for interne frangais, [1960] CLUNET 702; (France) ; Mfinch, Droit interna-
tional and droit interne d'apr6s la Constitution de Bonn, [1950] REV. INT. DR.
GENS 5 (Germany) ; Monaco, Die Internationalen Vertrdge and die neue italie-
nisehe Verfassung, 6 6STERREICsISCHE ZEITSCRIFT FOR OFFENTLICHES RECUT
285 (1954) (Italy) ; Seidl-Hohenveldern, Relations of International Law to In-
ternal Law in Austria, 49 Am. J. INT. L. 451, 460 (1955) (Austria). In many




legislative procedures involved in all law-making.41 Most con-
stitutions follow this approach and require implementing action
in all cases though several differences are displayed with regard
to the particular method whereby conventions become part of
the law of the land.42 Ratification (which may be made by the
executive branch of the government with or without the legisla-
ture's authorization or consent) is still a necessary prerequisite
for the international validity of the convention. In turn, the
international validity of the convention may (under domestic
law) be a prerequisite for the application of the convention in
national courts.4 3
Juridical Nature of Conventions for Uniform Law
The juridical nature of international treaties, and conven-
tions for uniform law, has been the subject matter of a formida-
ble literature.44 Conventions for uniform law actually involve
additional difficulties because they ordinarily contain two dis-
tinct sets of provisions. On the one hand, they include the rules
which are intended to become uniform in all contracting states,
and, on the other hand, provisions defining the international
obligations assumed by the contracting states among themselves.
41. See Mann, The Interpretation of Uniform Statutes, 62 L.Q. REV. 278
(1946) (Great Britain).
42. For a comparative survey of national practices, see DAUM, V6LKERRECHT
57-68 (1958) ; MENZEL, KOMMENTAR ZUM BONNER GRUNDOESETZ, under Art. 25;
2 MATERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS (1.932) ; Bayer, Auslegung
und Ergdnzung International Vereincheitlicher Normen durch Staatliche Gerichte,
20 RABEL'S Z. 603 (1955) ; Oliver, Historical Development of International Law:
Contemporary Problems of Treaty Law, [1955] II A.D.I.R.C. 421; Constantopou-
los, Verbindlichkeit und Konstruktion des positiven V61kerrechts 196-208 (1948) ;
Calogeropoulos-Stratis, La ratification des trait8s d'apr6s les constitutions recentes,
[1949] REV. HELL. DR. INT. 33.
43. Of. Dehaussy, Les conditions d'application des normes conventionnelles sur
le for interne frangais, [1960] CLUNET 702; Rice, supra, note 38, at 644.
44. See note 25 supra. On the juridical nature of treaties, see R1glade, De la
nature juridique des traitds internationax, [1924] REV. DR. PUB. ScI. POL. 510;
COLLIARD, INSTITUTIONES INTERNATIONALES 220 et seq. (1956) ; Oliver, Historical
Development of International Law: Contemporary Problems of Treaty Law, [1955]
II A.D.I.R.C. 421; Kraus, Syst~me et fonctions des traitds internationau, [1934]
IV A.D.I.R.C. 317; Visscher, La codification du droit international, [1925] I
A.D.I.R.C. 329; VISSCHER, TIItORIES ET RtALITItS EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 308, et seq. (1955) ; 2 SCELLE, PRtCIS BE DROIT DES GENS 332 et seq.
(1932); I SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 421 (1957), with compre-
hensive bibliography, id. at 758 et seq.; 1 OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 750 et seq. (1948) ; HARVARD RESEARCH OF THE LAW OF TREATIES,
SUPPLEMENT TO AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Part III 937 et seq.
(1935) ; McNAIB, LAW OF TREATIES (1938) ; 1 BARTIN, PRINCIPES DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 92 (1930); 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1943) ; ALLEN, THE TREATY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF LEGISLATION (1952) ; Rice,
The Position of International Treaties in Swiss Law, 46 AM. J. INT. L. 641
(1952).
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To the latter category belong the usual provisions relating to the
international validity of the convention, its possible revision, and
those concerning subsequent adherences. With regard to the
juridical nature of such provisions, there is not much disagree-
ment: they are contractual provisions functioning within the
framework of international law and constituting a lex inter
partes.
45
There is no agreement, however, with regard to the juridical
nature of the rules which are intended to become uniform in all
contracting states. 46  Such rules are regarded as "international
legislation," as a "model" for domestic legislation, or as belong-
ing to a category by themselves. The issue has practical signifi-
cance from both the viewpoints of international and domestic
law.
According to a line of thought prevailing mostly on the con-
tinent, the rules adopted in an international convention for the
unification of law constitute international legislation and belong
to the sphere of public international law.4 7 It follows that the
content of the international obligation assumed is not only to
give the rules agreed upon the force of law within the state48 but
45. Cf. 1 SCHWARZENBEROEB, INTERNATIONAL LAW 421 et seq. (1957) ; GOULD,
AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 294 (1957).
46. Actually, one may speak of several schools of thought in this area. But cf.
Lauterpacht, The So-called Anglo-American and Continental Schools of Thought,
12 BR. YRBK. OF INT. L. 43 (1931). Much of the difficulty actually results from
the fact that a variety of notions prevail in various parts of the world with regard
to the law of treaties in general. See SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN RELA-
TION TO THE WORK OF CODIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMIssIoN
52 (Memorandum submitted by the Secretary General, United Nations 1949).
47. See 2 SCELLE, PaRtiS DE DROIT DES GENS 530 (1932) ; Chauvaux, supra
note 25, at 575; DAVID, DROIT CIVIL COMPARIt 106 et seq. (1950) ; DE NAUROIS,
LES TRAITtS INTERNATIONAUX DEVANT LES JURISDICTIONS NATIONALES 55 (1934).
Cf. SCHERRER, op. cit. 8upra note 13, at 23; Mann, supra note 25, at 278: "The
term 'International legislation' may be used with regard to treaties the text of
which is being agreed upon and recommended for general acceptance at interna-
tional conferences by the representatives of numerous nations, and which, if rati-
fied, will by varying constitutional methods be infused into the municipal law of
the contracting states." OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, op. Cit. supra note 28, at 805.
See also JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND 51 (1958) ; PLAISANT, Op. cit.
supra note 25, at 34 et seq., id., 73 ff. The Permanent Court of International
Justice declared in the Serbian Loans Case that the rules of private international
law "may be common to several states and may even be established by interna-
tional conventions or customs and in the latter case may possess the character of
true international law governing the relations between states." (Emphasis added.)
See P.C.I.J. Series A, Ns. 21-22, p. 41.
48. With regard to methods of giving effect to uniform rules, see Matteucci,
supra note 14, at 75 et seq. Ordinarily, conventions grant an option to the con-
tracting states to give effect to the uniform rules directly as treaty law or to
enact domestic legislation reproducing the provisions of the convention. This was
the method followed in the Geneva conventions of June 7, 1930, on Bills of Ex-
change and Promissory Notes. By that convention, the contracting states bound
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also to interpret and apply them as rules of international law. 49
This view may also have consequences from the viewpoint of
domestic law, namely with regard to the method of incorpora-
tion; if the uniform rules constitute international legislation,
effect may be given to them according to some national consti-
tutions simply by ratification or by special executive acts with-
out resorting to ordinary legislative procedures.5 0
According to another line of thought, treaties in general, and
conventions for the unification of law, are regarded as contracts
themselves to introduce in their respective territories, either the original text of
the convention or a statute in the national language reproducing the uniform rules
annexed to the convention. Cf. Matteucci, supra, at 77 et 8eq. For a convention
providing for promulgation of a series of national statutes rather than promulga-
tion of the convention itself as treaty, see the Benelux Convention for Compulsory
Civil Liability Insurance of Motorists (Jan. 7, 1955). According to that conven-
tion, the national legislation of the contracting states should incorporate certain
fundamental principles set out in an annex. With regard to all other matters,
national legislation was left intact. Cf. Matteucci, supra.
49. See Duez, [1925] REV. GEN. DR. 429, 441. The problem of interpretation
of conventions for uniform law has been the subject of a heated controversy. In
general, it has been said that "the maintenance of uniformity in the interpretation
of a rule after its international adoption is just as important as the initial re-
moval of divergencies." The Eurymedon, [1938] P. 41, 61. Yet, the danger ofdivergencies of interpretation cannot be excluded at present. Several writers urge
the creation of International Tribunals charged with the duty of interpreting con-
ventions for uniform law. See Mann, The Interpretation of Uniform Statutes, 62
L.Q. REV. 278, 290, n. 67, 291 (1946) ; Chauveau, supra note 25, at 591. Most
countries have developed their own theories with regard to the interpretation of
uniform legislation. In the United States "no authoritative announcement has as
yet settled the principles governing interpretation of such statutes." Mann, supra
at 288. Of. McConaughy, International Law as Practiced in State Courts, 10So. CAR. L.Q. 189 (1958). In Great Britain, the courts are likely to construe
such legislation in the light of previous authorities and to apply domestic canons
of construction. See Gosse Millard, Ltd. v. Canadian Government Merchant Ma-
rine, Ltd., [1929] A.C. 223, 230. But cf. Stagg Line v. Foscolo Mango and Co.,[1932] A.C. 328, 343, 350 (no "predilection for the former law") ; McNair,
L'application et l'interprdtation des traitds d'aprds la jurisprudence britannique,[1933] I A.D.I.R.C. 43. In Germany, the purely formal view that statutes re-
producing the provisions of international conventions are pieces of national legis-
lation has been rejected. See Mann, supra, at 287-288; Bayer, Auslegung und
Er dnzung International Vereinheitlicher Normen durch Staatliche Gerichte, 20
RADEL'S Z. 603, 605 (1955). See also R.G. May 20, 1922, 104 R.G.Z. 352. In
France, at least two lines of thought have developed. See 1 BARTIN, PRINCIPES
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt 104 et seq. (1930) (uniform statutes must be
interpreted with reference to domestic law as any other statute). But of. DE
NAURoIs, LES TRAITdS INTERNATIONAUX DEVANT LES JURISDICTIONs NATIONALES
59 (1934); DAvm, DROIT CIVIL COMPARt 106 (1950); 3 NIBOYET, TRAITI DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIV FRANQAIS 375, 383 (1944) (international conventions
must be interpreted as international legislation). See also Cass., May 16, 1949,[1949] D.M.F. 411; Benoist, L'interpr4tation des trait6s d'apr4s la jurisprudence
francaise, 6 REV. HELL. DR. INT. 103 (1953).
50. See Calogeropoulos-Sratis, La ratification des traitds d'aprds les constitu-
tions rdcentes, [1949] REV. HELL. DR. INT. 53; McNair, The Method WherebyInternational Law Is Made To Prevail in Municipal Courts on an Issue of Inter-
national Law, 30 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROous SOCIETY 11 et seq. (1945) ;
Papalambrou, Le probidme de la "transformation" et la question de la validitd
des actes dtatiques "contraires" au droit international, [1950] REV. HELL. DR. INT.
234.
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among sovereigns. 51 The essence of the contract in the latter
case is a model (without any force of law) according to which
the national legislation of the contracting states must be formu-
lated. 52 It follows that the obligation assumed by the contract-
ing states is fully discharged by the introduction into the na-
tional legislation of rules identical with those of the model. 3
From the viewpoint of domestic law, the convention should be
given the force of law in accordance with the normal legislative
procedures provided for by the national constitution with regard
to all law making.5 4 The juridical nature of the uniform rules
is thus similar to the nature of any other rules of domestic law ;55
and being in reality domestic law, the convention should also be
interpreted as such. 56
Finally, a compromising attitude has been taken by certain
writers who suggest that the rules contained in international
conventions for uniform law constitute a category by themselves;
51. See MORLEY, TREATY LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 21 (1953) : "Treaties
are contracts among sovereigns"; 1 SCI WARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 421
(1957) ; OPPENIEIM-LAUTERPACHT, op. cit. supra note 28 at 792, n.1: "Interna-
tional treaties are contracts .... The tendency to speak of international treaties
as international legislation rather than contracts, is a metaphor."
52. Cf. text at note 107 infra; SCHERRER, op. cit. supra note 14, at 23. This is
the nature of the Uniform Laws prepared by the American Law Institute. The
several States of the Union in choosing to adopt the "model" as a statute act
voluntarily with the view to achieving and preserving uniformity among the states
and not under constitutional mandate or international obligation. Cf. Matteucci,
supra note 14, at 77; Nadelman & Reese, The American Proposal at the Hague
Conference on Private International Law to Use the Method of Uniform Laws, 7
AM. J. COMP. L. 239 (1958). The proposal was that, as an alternative to inter-
national agreements, the possibilities inherent in the formulation of model laws
be considered. It was regarded as "an unsettled novelty and met with little
enthusiasm." See Oliver, Standardization of Choice of Law Rules for Interna-
tional Contracts: Should there be a new Beginning?, 53 AM. J. INT. L. 385, 386
(1959).
53. Cf. SCIIERRER, op. cit. supra note 14, at 23.
54. Cf. VERDROSS, VOLKERRECHIT 69 et seq. (1955) ; SCHERRER, op. cit. supra
note 14, at 23; note 50 supra.
55. See Jenks, The Conflict of Law-making Treaties, 30 BR. YRBK. OF INT.
L. 401 (1953) ; McNair, International Legislation, 19 IOWA L. REV. 178 (1934),
pointing out that the term "international legislation" is a metaphor since "the
essence of 'legislation' is that it binds all persons subject to the jurisdiction of the
body legislating, whether they assent to it or not, whether their duly appointed
representatives assent to it or not" whereas international legislation binds only
"parties who have duly signed the law-making treaty, and, where necessary, as
it usually is, have ratified it." See also [1935] IRABEL'S Z. 48, 49.
56. See Duez, [1925] R v. GEN. DR. 429, 441 (the judge is entitled to ignore
public international law and to apply municipal law pure and simple; 1 BARTIN,
I'RINCIPES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVI' 104 et seq. (1930). See also note 49
supra. On the problem of interpretation of treaties in general, see YI-TING CHIANG,
THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES BY JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS (1933) ; VIsscER,
THtORIRS ET REALITItS EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 308 et seq. (1955) ; 1
SCHWARZEN3ERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 488 et seq. (1957) ; Lauterpacht, De
l'interprdtation des traitds, 43 I ANN. INST. DR. INT. 366-460 (1950) ; id., 44
1 pp. 197-223 (1952) ; Id., 45 I pp. 225-230 (1953).
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such conventions have two aspects, one international and the
other domestic. 57 The international aspect consists in the fact
that conventions for uniform law regulate relations among sov-
ereigns as they contain an international law obligation to enact
legislation in conformity with the convention, and in the origin
and function of the uniform rules. The domestic aspect consists
in the fact that the uniform rules are primarily intended to regu-
late relations of private individuals and in that the method of
incorporation is ordinarily determined by domestic rather than
international law.
Consequently, while the provisions defining the scope of the
assumed obligations belong to the sphere of international law,
the rules intended to become uniform are neither international
legislation nor merely models for domestic legislation. They are
not international legislation because the plenipotentiaries of the
contracting states do not constitute a legislative organ of the
international community, and because international law, ordi-
narily, regulates only relations among sovereigns. On the other
hand, the uniform rules are not merely a model for domestic
legislation because according to some constitutions effect may be
given to them by ratification alone or by special statutes and
ordinances without resorting to ordinary legislative procedures.
And after their incorporation into the several legal systems one
way or another, the interpretation of the uniform rules may be
controlled by international rather than domestic law. This ap-
proach, placing emphasis on the distinctly dual character of con-
ventions for uniform law, and claiming autonomy for "interna-
tional uniform law," ' offers several advantages: leaves room
for harmless differences of opinion with regard to the juridical
nature of conventions for uniform law, explains sufficiently dif-
ferences in legislative and judicial practices prevailing in various
parts of the world, and may eventually result in an expansion of
unification to the advantage of international relations.
57. See OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, op. cit. supra note 28, at 805; Bayer,
Auslegung und Ergdnzung International Vereinheitlicher Normen durch Staatliche
Gerichte, 20 RABEL'S Z. 603, 629 (1955), stressing the dual nature of interna-
tional uniform law. The author further suggests that international tribunals may
take jurisdiction on issues involving interpretation and application of conventions
for uniform law (at 630). However, the court of International Justice has so far
refrained from exercising jurisdiction to resolve conflicts in the interpretation of
conventions for uniform law. See Bayer, supra, at 642. See also DAVID, DROIT
CIVIL COMPAR]t 106 (1950). (Stressing "international origin") ; JENKS, THE
COMMON LAW OF MANKIND 51 (1958)."
58. See Vallindas, Autonomy of International Uniform Law, [19551 REv.
HELL. DR. INT. 8; Chauveau, supra note 25, at 579.
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Scope of Unification
It is submitted that from the viewpoint of intended uniform-
ity, and impact on problems of conflict of laws, international
conventions for uniform law may be distinguished into two cate-
gories;59 (a) those designed to suppress conflicts of substantive
or choice of law rules by making such rules uniform in all of the
contracting states ;60 and (b) those designed not only to suppress
existing conflicts but to eliminate completely the necessity of
resorting to choice of law rules by introducing uniform legisla-
tion applicable to international transactions or to both domestic
and international transactions.6 1
Unification of conflicts rules. A certain measure of certainty
is achieved where the parties know in advance that irrespective
of the forum a potential dispute will be referred to a definite
legal system in accordance with choice of law rules which are
59. On classification of conventions, see SCHERRER, INTERNATIONALE VEREIN-
HEITLINCflUNO DES PRIVATRECHTS 23 et seq. (1939), distinguishing between con-
ventions applicable to international transactions alone and both to domestic and
international transactions. However, Scherrer seems to consider the contact of
nationality as the only possible tool for the delimitation of the area of application
of such conventions, and, further, seems to confuse the "model"-type convention
with the distinct problem of scope of unification. Chauveau, supra note 25, at
571, apparently sees only one type of convention for uniform law, viz., that
applicable to international transactions alone. DAVID, DROIT CIVIL COMPARt. 106
(1950), distinguishes conventions for uniform law designed to modify the domestic
law and others designed to create a parallel legal order, a specific regime for
international transactions. SCIINITZER, DE LA DIVERSITIt ET DE L'UNIFICATION DU
DROIT 32 et seq. (1946), distinguishes between conventions designed to eliminate
conflicts of international laws and treaties creating uniform law either for interna-
tional relations or for both international and domestic relations.
On the problem of classification of treaties in general, see OPPENHEIm-LAUTER-
PACHT, op. cit. supra note 28, at 793; 1 ROUSSEAU, PRINCIPES O]IN]IRAUX DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 134 et seq. (1944) ; Kraus, Syst~me et fonctions
des traitds internationaux, [1934] IV A.D.I.R.C. 317, 336 If., where treaties "for
the establishment of uniform law" are placed in a category by themselves; 1
A aMINJoN, TRAITlI DE DROIT COMPARI 96 et seq. (1950); DE NAUROIS, LES
TRAITtS INTERNATIONAUX DEVANT LES JURISDICTIONS NATIONALES 55 (1934). Con-
tinental writers usually distinguish between trait6-loi and traitd-contrat. See
Rdglade, supra note 43. For a historical development of the doctrine and a
critique, see Kraus, supra at 333; Arminjon, supra at 96 et seq. The term traitd-
contrat applies to treaties regulating opposing interests among contracting states
or terminating disputes (e.g., Treaties of Peace) ; the term traitd-loi applies to
instruments deriving from an accord of wills oriented to the same end which is to
subject the contracting states to an objective rule of law. Of. 2 SCELLE, PRtCIS
DE DROIT DES GENS 332 (1932) ; 1 SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAw 421
et seq. (1957).
60. See 1 BARTIN, PRINCIES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIV]t 85 et 8eq. (1930).
Cf. SCELLE, op. cit. supra note 59, at 530 et seq.
61. See Matteucci, Les mdthodes de l'unification du droit, [1956] II L'UNIFI-
CATION DU DROIT 35: "One must distinguish between uniform rules which are
meant to govern only relationships qualified as international (on the basis of a
criterion of qualification established by the same rules) and those rules, which,
on the contrary, must also apply to domestic relationships." See also BARTIN,
op. oit. aupra note 60, at 86 et seq.
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everywhere the same. 62 Interested parties will thus have the
opportunity to choose the applicable law by selecting the proper
contacts without advance information as to the conflicts law of
a number of countries. This result may be achieved by interna-
tional conventions designed to make uniform the choice of law
rules in the various contracting states.6 3 Under such conventions,
differences of substantive regulation still persist; the conven-
tion merely delimits the respective area of application of the law
of the contracting parties and determines the cases in which one
of the national legislations will apply to the exclusion of all
others.6 4 Yet, certainty will be deceptive in some cases as the
interpretation of the applicable law may differ with the forum,
and as its varying substantive content may not be readily ascer-
tainable. 5 Further, resort to the notion of public policy may in
some cases exclude the application of foreign law. 6
Unification of substantive law. A still higher measure of
certainty and predictability is achieved where differences in
national legislations are eliminated by adoption of uniform sub-
stantive rules of law in accordance with the provisions of an in-
62. See Matteucci, supra note 4, at 152. Originally, conventions for uniform
law were regarded as a matter of conflicts law exclusively; and further, the
situation was confused with unification by voluntary adoption of foreign law. See
Chauveau, supra note 25, at 753.
63. This has been the moving force behind all efforts for the adoption of an
international convention designed to unify the choice of law rules governing the
contract of affreightment. See ComitA Maritime International, International Sub-
committee on Conflict of Laws, Minutes of the Brighton Meeting, Sept. 21, 1954.
At this point, three draft resolutions for an "International Convention of the Law
to be applied to Contracts of Maritime Transports of Goods" are under considera-
tion. See Comitd Maritime International, International sub-committee on Con-
flict of Laws concerning Contracts of Carriage, Minutes of the Brighton Meeting,
Sept. 21, 1954. According to the first draft resolution, the law of the place of
shipment should be compulsorily applicable. See Art. 2, I, p. 13. The second draft
resolution proposes application of the law of the principal business establishment
or residence of the carrier. See Art. 2, I. Finally, the third draft resolution
provides for application of the law of the flag. See Art. 2, I-11, p. 25. Accom-
panying reports or express caveats make it clear that the proposed convention
will leave intact Art. X of the Brussels Convention. See Stdter, supra note 3,
at 222.
To this category belong also the various Hague conventions, adopted with the
purpose of making uniform the conflicts law of the contracting states. The Geneva
Conference resulted in the adoption of additional conventions designed to regulate
certain conflict of laws problems with regard to Bills of Exchange and Promissory
Notes (1930) and Checks (1931). The conflicts rules were included in a sep-
arate convention from the substantive uniform rules, thus permitting the states
to sign the conflicts convention without accepting the uniform rules or vice versa.
See Nolde, La Codification du droit international priv6, [1936] I A.D.I.R.C. 303,
402.
64. See BATiiq, op. cit supra note 60, at 86; DE NAUROIs, Op. cit. supra note
49, at 56.
65. See Hamel, Perspectives et limites de l'unification du droit priv6 Actes du
Congres International de droit prive, [1951] II L'UNIFICATION nu DoIT 60, 65.
66. See Matteucci, supra note 12.
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ternational convention. 67 If all states in the world were to par-
ticipate in such a convention, conflicts rules would lose most of
their practical significance with regard to the subject matter
regulated by the convention.6 Persisting diversity of conflicts
rules, indeed, would not work material harm, since, irrespective
of the choice of law rules applied, the transaction would in any
event be localized in one of the contracting states.69
When, as it usually happens, uniformity of substantive law
is limited to a number only of contracting states, conflicts rules
do not lose their practical significance.7 ° As between such states,
it may make little difference which of the uniform legislations
apply; yet, localization of the transaction in one of the contract-
ing states and determination of the applicable law will be always
made in accordance with choice of law rules.7 Further, conflicts
rules will be necessary to solve conflicts problems arising due to
different interpretations of the uniform law in the various con-
tracting states and conflicts with the law of countries not parti-
cipating in the convention.7 2
Ordinarily, the two approaches outlined hereinabove are
combined, and conventions for uniform law result in unification
of both substantive and choice of law rules.78 In that case, inter-
ested parties may easily select the applicable law and readily
ascertain its content which, apart from differences of interpre-
tation,7 4 is the same in all of the signatory countries.
As indicated, uniformity of substantive law and conflict rules
does not avoid the necessity of resorting to choice of law rules. 75
Choice of law becomes completely unnecessary between contract-
ing states only by virtue of international conventions introducing
67. See Demogue, L'unification international de droit privd [1937] CLtTNET
699, 722; Matteucci, supra note 4, at 152; Ripert, La loi frangaise du 2 avril
1936 sur le transport des marchandises par mer, [1936] Riv. DIR. NvE. 367;
Hamel, supra note 65, at 60, 69.
68. Cf. BARTIN, op. cit. supra note 60, at 86.
69. Ibid.
70. See Yiannopoulos, Conflicts Problems in International Bills of Lading:
Validity of "Negligence" Clauses, 18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 609, 611 (1958).
But cf. BARTIN, op. cit. supra note 60, at 86.
71. Cf. text at note 5 et seq. supra; Bystrinsky & Landa, The Unification of
Laws on International Sale, 6 REV. OF CONTEMP. L. 67, 101 (1959).
72. See Matteucci, supra note 4, at 152; Bystrinsky & Landa, supra note 71,
at 101.
73. See DE NAUROIS, LES TRAITAS INTERNATIONAUX DEVANT LES JURISDICTIONS
NATIONALES 57 (1934) ; JENKS, TIE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND 51 (1958).
74. Cf. BARTIN, op. Cit. supra note 60, at 105; 3 NIBOYET, TRAITA DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PRIV1t FRANCAIS 383 (1944) ; note 49 supra.
75. See text at notes 71-72 supra.
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uniform legislation applicable to international transactions or to
both domestic and international transactions in accordance with
specified contacts.
76
In the first case, each country applies the same substantive
rules of law as a modern "jus gentium" to all cases involving the
specified international contacts,77 without resorting to choice of
law rules. Under such circumstances we have a juxtaposition
between the rules adopted in the convention and the national
regulation of the contracting states which may have a different
content.78 However, each country, though not under interna-
tional obligation, may extend the application of the uniform rules
to domestic transactions. 79 Indeed, the retention of two distinct
bodies of law within the same jurisdiction may give rise to dif-
ficult questions of delimitation of their respective areas of ap-
plication and may result in unequal administration of justice.8°
In the second case, each state applies the same substantive
rules of law whether the relations involve exclusively domestic
or international contacts.81 As in the preceding case, there is no
room for application of a definite national law; and even further,
citizenship of the parties and all other traditional contacts util-
ized to designate a transaction as "international" become ir-
76. See SCHERRER, op. cit. supra note 14, at 24; Demogue, supra note 67, at
722; 1 RiPERT, DROIT MARITIME 71 (1950) ; HAMEL ET LAZARD, TRAIT]t DE DROIT
COMMERCIAL 54 (1954).
77. See Matteucci, Les mdthodes de l'unification du droit, [1956] II L'UNIFI-
CATION DU DROIT 2, 35. As to the juridical nature of the uniform rules included
in such conventions, see text at notes 47 et seq. supra. A distinguishing feature of
such conventions is ordinarily a provision delimiting unilaterally the area of
application of the uniform rules. Cf. note 139 infra.
78. This method was followed, e.g., in the Warsaw Convention on Air Trans-
ports, the two Bern Conventions on Rail Transports, and in the Geneva Protocol
on Arbitration Clauses. Unification of law with regard to international trans-
actions alone has the additional advantage of allowing freedom to drafting com-
mittees to adopt the best possible rule without following slavishly the pattern of
a number of domestic legislations; and, further, adoption of such conventions by a
large number of nations is facilitated by the fact that "supremacy" of the do-
mestic law in the domestic sphere remains intact. Of. Matteucci, supra note 77,
at 55. The criteria adopted for the definition of "international" transactions
frequently vary with the subject matter of the convention; thus difference of
nationality of the parties, domicile of the contracting parties in different countries,
and difference of points of departure and destination in connection with carriage
contracts, have been utilized in a number of international conventions.. Of.
Matteucci, supra note 77, at 55. Bystrinsky & Landa, The Unification of Laws on
International Sale. 6 REV. OF CONTEMP. L. 67, 72 (1959).
79. See ScHu.RnR, op. cit. supra note 14, at 24; 1 RiPERT, DROIT MARITIME
72 (1950) ; id., note 157 infra.
80. Of. Yiannopoulos, supra note 17, at 520 et seq.
81. See SCHERREaR, op. Cit. supra note 14, at 24. Such are the Geneva Con-
ventions on Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes (June 7, 1930), and Checks
(March 19, 1931). Cf. Limpens, Les constantes de l'unification du droit privd,
[1958] REV. INT. DR. CoMP. 287.
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relevant. The uniform rules apply to the specified transactions




As in case of all conventions for uniform law, the effects of
the Brussels Convention should be measured in the light of both
international and domestic law.
There is no doubt that the obligations of the states adhering
to the Brussels Convention are governed by international law.83
However, in part due to disagreement as to controlling prin-
ciples of international law, and in part due to conflicting inter-
pretations of the text of the convention, writers are not in agree-
ment as to the content of the international obligations assumed
by the contracting states. Thus, conflicting views have been taken
with regard to the intended method and scope of unification, the
connected issue of the area of application of the uniform rules,
and finally, the crucial problem of the determination as to which
rules were intended to become uniform. The first two questions
are discussed at length in another part of the present article.84
With regard to the last problem, the prevailing view is that the
rules intended to become uniform are included in Articles I to
VIII of the convention. 5 It is submitted, however, that the text
itself of the convention leads to the conclusion that the uniform
rules are contained in Articles I to X. The remaining Articles
XI to XVI contain provisions of a public law nature regulating
the international effects of the convention and the relations
among the contracting states.
Every international convention raises the issue of its direct
application in municipal courts by virtue of ratification and op-
eration of international law, and further, in case implementing
legislation is enacted, the issue of the relations between the con-
vention and the domestic legislation. The latter problem is ordi-
narily a theoretical one since in most instances conventions and
corresponding domestic acts contain identical provisions."6 In
the case of the Brussels Convention, however, important varia-
82. See text at notes 47 et 8eq. 8upra; 111 et seq. infra.
83. Cf. text at note 28 supra.
84. See text at note 114 et 8eq. infra.
85. See text at note 129 et seq. infra.
86. See MARKIANOS, DIE UBERNAJIME DER IIAAGER REGELN IN DIE NATIONALEN
GES ETZE IDBER DIE VERFRACHTEnHAFTUNO 51 (1960) (hereinafter Markianos).
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tions between the text of the convention and that of the various
national acts8 7 render necessary an investigation with regard to
the binding force of the convention as such on courts and indi-
viduals in the contracting states.
According to the prevailing opinion among scholars of inter-
national law, in absence of express intention of the contracting
states, ratification produces effects only in the international
sphere. It establishes an international obligation for the contract-
ing states to take appropriate measures giving the force of law
to the convention in the municipal sphere.8 The text of the Brus-
sels Convention contains no indication that the contracting states
intended the convention to operate directly, and it follows that
its applicability in municipal courts will necessarily depend on
rules of municipal law. Further, the Protocol of Signature seems
to strengthen this conclusion.8 9
In states where constitutional provisions require implement-
ing legislation, it is clear that only such legislation has the force
of law in municipal courts since neither international law nor
domestic law attribute binding force to the convention as such.
Problems, however, may arise in states where according to con-
stitutional provisions properly signed and ratified international
conventions become part of the law of the land. In such a case,
the courts will have to decide whether the Brussels Convention
is self-executing or not.m
While the issue is actually one of constitutional interpreta-
tion, the intention of the contracting states as evidenced in the
text of the convention itself might be controlling under some con-
stitutions.91 It is submitted, however, that the Brussels Conven-
tion is self-contradictory in this regard. Its Article X might lead
to the conclusion that the convention was intended to be self-
executing while the Protocol of Signature might lead to the con-
trary conclusion.9 2 Perhaps a reasonable interpretation is that
the contracting states left the issue for individual determination
by each state concerned.
A survey of results reached in several contracting states may
87. In that regard, the most important variation between the Convention and
several national Acts involves the limit of the shipowner's liability. See MARKIA-
NOS 51.
88. See text at note 28 supra.
89. See text at note 103 infra. Cf. MARKIANOS 52.
90. Cf. text at note 38 supra.
91: Cf. text at note 39 supra.
92. Cf. text at note 103 infra.
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be interesting in that regard. In the United States, it seems that
the Brussels Convention has been regarded as self-executing.9 3
However, the issue of its direct application in American courts
has been circumvented by means of an "understanding" accom-
panying the act of ratification. According to this understanding,
which was in effect a reservation, 94 if the provisions of the con-
vention should conflict with the provisions of the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, the latter should prevail.95 The result of that
understanding was then to define the scope of the international
obligation assumed by the United States, and to control at the
same time the domestic effects of ratification. The convention,
though part of the law of the land according to the Constitution,
was made applicable in American courts only to the extent its
provisions were reenacted in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.
Among other contracting states, the issue of the direct appli-
cation of the Brussels Convention in municipal courts may also
arise in Monaco, Poland, 96 Spain,97 and Switzerland" due to con-
stitutional provisions and judicial practices reflecting monistic
doctrines. In all these countries, in absence of authoritative judi-
cial determination, conflicting views have been entertained by
scholars, some assuming that the Brussels Convention is self-
executing and others that implementing legislation was contem-
plated. In France, and in Italy, however, the issue has not been
raised since the Brussels Convention has as such the force of
law by virtue of its "execution" by implementing legislation. 9
Juridical Nature
The general disagreement among scholars of international
law with regard to the juridical nature of conventions for uni-
93. Cf. KNAUTH 153.
94. Reservations operate reciprocally and result in confining international
conventional obligations within desired limits. In case of self-executing conven-
tions, the domestic effects of the convention are determined on the basis of the
reservation rather than the original text. See Dehaussy, Lea conditions d'applica-
tion des norme8 conventionnelles sur le for interne franvai8, [1960] CLUNET 702;
and in general, HOLLOWAY-ROUSSEAU, LES RItSERVES DANS LES TRAITS INTER-
NATIONAUX (1958).
95. See KNAUTH 153. The text of the "Understanding" is reproduced id. at 77.
96. See MATYSIK, PODRECZNIK PRAWA MORSKIEGO (MANUAL OF MARITIME
LAW) 32, 183 (1959). But cf. MARIIANos 39, n. 39, 43, n. 6a.
97. See Farina, [1953] D.M.F. 415. But cf. MARKIANOS 55.
98. See HOSNER, LA RESPONSABILITt DU TRANSPORTEUR MARITIME 12, 15, 17
(1956). But Of. M~tLLER, [1960] D.M.F. 634.
99. See Yiannopoulos, Bills of Lading and the Conflict of Laws: Validity of
"Negligence" Clauses in France, 7 Am. J. CoMP. L. 516, 520 (1958) ; Gaeta,
[1957] D.M.F. 697 (Italy).
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form law is reflected in the attitude of legislators and courts in
various states adhering to the Brussels Convention. Accordingly,
in some states the convention is regarded as "international legis-
lation,"' ° while in others as a "model" for domestic legislation. 1 1
In that regard, it is not only general international law that
fails to furnish definitive answers; recourse to the text of the
convention itself also fails to establish generally acceptable prop-
ositions. Indeed, the convention seems to be self-contradictory
with regard to its juridical nature and two different approaches
are entirely justifiable in the light of its very text. In this con-
nection, two provisions need consideration: Article X and the
Protocol of Signature. Article X declares that "The provisions
of this Convention shall apply to all bills of lading issued in the
territory of any of the contracting States. ' 10 2 The Protocol of
Signature, on the other hand, grants an option to the signatory
countries to incorporate the uniform rules, if they so desire, in
a form appropriate to their national legislation. 108
At first sight, these provisions do not seem to answer the
question whether the Brussels Convention was conceived as in-
ternational legislation or as a model for domestic legislation;
and, probably, at the time the Convention was drafted no one
was concerned with theoretical differences prevailing in various
parts of the world with regard to the nature of conventions for
uniform law, or with the more specific question of the juridical
nature of the Brussels Convention itself. Yet, both Articles X
100. See ST6DTER, GESCHICHTE DER KONNOSSEMENTSKLAUSELN 99 (1956) (In-
ternationales Recht) ; AsTLE, SHIPOWNERS' CARGO LIABILITIES AND IMMUNITIES
86 ("international legislation") ; Delaume, Note, [1950] REV. CH. DR. INT. PR.
428; MARAIS, LA LOI DU 2 AVRIL 1936 RELATIVE AUX TRANSPORTS DES MARCHAN-
DISES PAR MER 71 (1937) ; SAUVAGE, LA LAGISLATION NOUVELLE SUR LES TRANS-
PORTS MARITIMES DE MARCHANDISES 149 (1937); Ripert, LG Confdrence Diplo-
matique do Bruxelles, [1923] II REV. Don. 49. Cf. text at note 47 et 8eq. supra.
101. See KNAUTH 154; MARAIS, LES TRANSPORTS INTERNATIONAUX DE MAR-
CHANDISES PAR MER ET LA JURISPRUDENCE EN DROIT COMPARE 18, 103 (1949) ;
1 RIPERT, DROIT MARITIME 72: "The International Convention is thus the mnodel
that each legislator should follow." But cf. Ripert, La Confdrence Diplomatique
de Bruxelles, [1923] II REV. DOR. 49, 50; id. La loi frangaise du 2 avril 1936
sur le transport des marchandi8es par mer, [1936] Riv. Din. NAV. 367, 368: "Not
a model." Apparently, according to Professor Ripert the Convention is "interna-
tional law" with regard to international transactions, and a "model" for domestic
legislation with regard to transactions involving exclusively domestic contacts.
See also text at note 128 et seq. infra.
102. See Convention, Art. X.
103. See Protocol of Signature: "The High Contracting Parties may give effect
to this Convention either by giving it the force of law or by including in their
national legislation in a form appropriate to that legislation, the rules adopted
under this Convention." According to its opening sentence "the present protocol
' . will have the same validity as if the provisions thereof were inserted in the
very text of the convention to which it refers."
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and the Protocol of Signature were intended to regulate certain
practical consequences of such theoretical distinctions; and thus,
by answering the question whether the Brussels Convention
should be given the force of law as such or by virtue of domestic
legislation, both provisions seem to be relevant in the determina-
tion of the juridical nature of the convention.
Indeed, Article X is predicated on the assumption that the
uniform rules were designed to have the force of law by virtue
of an international convention as such,10 4 and seems to adopt,
by implication, the notion that a convention for uniform law
creates rules distinct as to their origin and function from rules
of domestic law. Further, it seems to have been conceived in
view of a more or less uniform practice prevailing in Europe,
where, according to constitutional provisions conventions become
part of the law of the land by a series of public acts substantially
different from ordinary legislative procedures. 10 5
The Protocol of Signature, on the other hand, by granting an
option to the contracting states to incorporate the uniform rules
in a form appropriate to their national legislations, seems predi-
cated on the contrary assumption that the convention was a
model for domestic legislation. 0 6 The Protocol of Signature thus
accords with the practice prevailing in England and the other
members of the Commonwealth where conventions for uniform
law are regarded as models acquiring binding force after trans-
formation into domestic law by statute.107
The Protocol of Signature was a compromise. 08 In this con-
nection, it should be mentioned that as a result of the option
granted by the Protocol of Signature, an additional difficulty
was circumvented. The uniform rules reproduced in essence
Anglo-American ways of thinking as to both substance and form
of drafting. 09 Introduction, therefore, of the convention as such
104. Cf. text at note 47 supra.
105. Cf. Calogeropoulos-Sratis, La ratification des traitds d'apr~s les consti-
tutions r~centes, [1.949] REV. HELL. DR. INT. 33; Oliver, Historical Development
of International Law; Contemporary Problems of Treaty Law, [1955] II
A.D.I.R.C. 421, 446, 449; VEEDROSS, VYLLKERRECHT 68 et 8eq. (1955).
106. Cf. text at note 52 supra.
107. Cf. Mann, The Interpretation of Uniform Statutes, 62 L.Q. REv. 279, 290
(1946) ; Oliver, supra note 105, at 445.
108. See Stddter, Zur Statutenkollision im Seefrachtvertrag, in LinER AmicO-
RUM OF CONGRATULATIONS TO ALGOT BAGGE 220, 226 (1955).
109. See Necker, Comment, [1958] RECIT DER SCMIFFAHRT No. 9/10 p. 12. See
also ST6DTER, GESCHICHTE DER KONNOSSEMENTSKLAUSELN 96, 97 (1954);




into the domestic order of continental nations might prove dis-
astrous for the symmetry of their law and might create difficult
problems of application and interpretation. 110 By granting an
option to the contracting states to incorporate the uniform rules
in a form appropriate to their legislation, the Protocol of Signa-
ture prevented further objections on that issue.
We may thus conclude that, neither on the basis of interna-
tional law nor on the basis of the text of the convention, a gen-
eral answer may be given to the question whether the Brussels
Convention 6onstitutes "international legislation" or merely a
model for domestic legislation. The answer will necessarily de-
pend on the accepted doctrines concerning international law and
the positive law of each country."' Where conventions for uni-
form law are regarded as international legislation, and the Brus-
sels Convention is given the force of law as such, the uniform
rules may validly be regarded as rules of treaty law." 2 On the
other hand, where conventions for uniform law are generally re-
garded as models, and advantage is taken of the option granted
in the Protocol of Signature, the uniform rules may validly be
regarded as model for domestic legislation."13
Scope of Intended Unification
An investigation with regard to the scope of the intended
unification by the Brussels Convention is important for the de-
termination of the international responsibility of the contracting
states. Such responsibility may differ with the type of the par-
ticular convention. 11 4 Thus, if the Brussels Convention was de-
signed to unify only substantive rules of law, the obligations as-
sumed by the contracting states would be fully discharged by the
introduction of the necessary legislation as substantive law gov-
erning bills of lading; the area of application of that legislation
could be freely determined according to traditional conflicts
rules." 5 If the convention was intended to unify both substantive
and choice of law rules, the several contracting states should in-
troduce the uniform rules as substantive law and at the same
110. See Stbdter, supra note 108.
111. See text at notes 47 et seq., 33-36, 51 et seq. supra.
112. Cf. Chauveau, supra note 25, at 581: "The supra-national nature of the
convention is moreover formally admitted by Art. 26 of the French Constitution of
Oct. 27, 1946, so that in case of any conflict with internal law, preference must
be accorded to the Convention."
113. See e.g. Great Britain, text at notes 51, 107 supra.
114. Cf. text at notes 109, 29, 59, supra.
115. Cf. text at note 67 et 8eq. supra.
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time should adopt the conflicts rules agreed upon; any other
choice of law would constitute a violation of the convention. 116
If, on the other hand, the convention was conceived as special
law applicable to international transactions, or to both domestic
and international transactions, the international responsibility
of the contracting states should be discharged by legislation in-
troducing the uniform rules into the domestic law and making
them applicable to the specified transactions.
1 17
The preparatory works of the Brussels Convention offer no
indication as to the scope of the intended unification, namely the
area of application of the uniform rules and the closely connected
problem of their relation to the national legislation of the con-
tracting states.-" The only relevant official statement in that
regard is Article X of the convention (quoted above 1 9 ) so that
a brief reference to its history and interpretation may be rele-
vant at this point.
Very little can be found in the oral proceedings of the Brus-
sels Diplomatic Conference with regard to the origin and mean-
ing of Article X.120 The absence of discussion and comments
may be due to the fact that the original Hague Rules, 1921, were
designed for voluntary adoption by the shipping companies and
were drafted in the form of a uniform bill of lading rather than
in the form of a statute. Provisions regulating conflict of laws
or corresponding to Article X were omitted.' 21 Similarly, a draft
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act put into circulation by the United
Kingdom Chamber of Shipping did not include any provisions
for the solution of conflict problems. 122 Such provisions appeared
for the first time in the text submitted to the London Conference
of the Comit6 Maritime International, in October, 1922.128 Ar-
116. Cf. text at note 73 8upra.
117. Cf. text at note 75 et 8eq. supra.
118. The question was raised by Sir Leslie Scott, but was not discussed. See
BRussELs CONFERENCE, PRECIkS-VERBAL DE LA SEPTIhMIE SIIANCE PLtNIJRE, p.
153 (Sir Le8lie Scott). See also p. 213.
119. See text at note 102 supra.
120. Cf. note 103 supra. The text of the uniform rules, and the several drafts
of the Brussels Convention are reproduced in French and English in COMITA
MARTIME INTERNATIONAL, Bulletin No. 65 (Conference of Gothemburg) 319 et
seq. (1923).
121. See St6dter, aupra note 108, at 225. Further, it seems that an extended
discussion at the Hague Meeting on the nature of the uniform rules as "strict"
law, and an optimistic view that once the law would become uniform conflicts
would disappear, account for the conspicuous absence of elaboration on the area
of application of the uniform rules and the solution of conflicts problems.
122. See COMIT]t MARITIME INTERNATIONAL, Bulletin No. 65 (Conference of
Gothemburg) 336 (1923).
123. Id. at 349 et seq.
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ticle IX of the proposed convention provided :124 "The provisions
of this Convention shall be applied in every Contracting State
when either of the parties interested belongs to another contract-
ing State and also in all other cases provided in the national
legislations. However: (1) The principle enunciated in the pre-
ceding paragraph does not prejudice the right of the Contracting
States not to apply the provisions of this Convention in favor of
parties belonging to a non-contracting State. (2) When all the
interested parties belong to the same State as the Court to which
the case is submitted it is the municipal law and not the Conven-
tion which is applicable."
This lucid provision was eliminated, without apparent rea-
son,125 from the final draft submitted to the Brussels Diplomatic
Conference of 1922. The Diplomatic Conference then added a
new Article IX which read precisely the same as Article X of
the final convention.126 The same provision appears for the first
time as Article X in the Draft Convention of the Subcommittee
of the Brussels Diplomatic Conference, 1923, and it was kept as
such until the convention was signed on August 25, 1924.127
The seemingly simple and clear language of Article X has
given rise to much speculation as to its meaning and possible
interpretation. Article X has thus been explained as an inter-
governmental promise to enact legislation reproducing the sub-
stantive provisions of the convention, as a uniform choice of law
rule providing for application of the law of the place of contract-
ing, as a uniform rule delimiting the application of the conven-
tion to international bills of lading or to both domestic and inter-
national bills of lading. Finally, it has been suggested that Ar-
ticle X should be completely disregarded as devoid of meaning.
In accordance with the notion that conventions for uniform
law are models for domestic legislation, 128 Article X has been
explained in England, the United States, and the common law
world in general as an express promise by each contracting state
to enact as domestic law Article I to VIII of the convention, con-
taining all substantive provisions.12
124. Id. at 358, 371 et seq.
125. CI. Stdter, supra note 108, at 225.
126. See COMITt MARITIME INTERNATIONAL, Bulletin No. 65 (Conference of
Gothemburg) 375, 385 (1923).
127. Id. at 407 et seq.
128. See text at note 52 supra.
129. See BAUMERT, COMPARISON OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION AND THE INTER-
NATIONAL CONVENTION FOB THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULES OF LAW RELAT-
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This interpretation cannot be accepted in view of the very
language of Article X. Further, weight should be given to con-
tinental interpretations which consistently regard Article X as
a conflicts rule and ignore completely the view that Article X
constitutes an intergovernmental promise. Unlike the substan-
tive provisions of the Brussels Convention which reproduce
essentially Anglo-American ways of thinking, Article X seems
to accord with continental doctrines concerning the juridical na-
ture of conventions for uniform law. 80 And as Article X does
not figure in the original Hague Rules but was first inserted in
the Brussels Conference where the representatives from the com-
mon law world were in the minority, it is possible that Article X
is the product of continental thought. Finally, the British dele-
gates at the Conference clearly regarded the new article as a con-
flicts rule.'
8 1
Article X has been further explained as a uniform choice of
law rule providing for the application of the law of the place
of contracting, namely as establishing an obligation for the con-
tracting states to make their conflicts rules uniform by applying
the law of the place where the bill of lading was issued.8 2 This
view has been recently challenged on the ground that it is by no
means clear that Article X refers to the law of the place of issue
of the bill of lading; it is much more probable that it refers to
ING TO BILLS OF LADING (1928), under Art. X: "The foregoing articles of the
Convention are for the most part administrative in character and are obviously
unsuitable for adoption by those countries choosing to incorporate the uniform
rules as a part of their commercial codes or to enact the provisions in statutory
form rather than as an international convention." See also KNAUTH 152, 154;
Graveson, Bills of Lading and the Unification of Maritime Law in the English
Courts, in CONFLICT OF LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 57, 66 (1949).
130. See text at note 47 supra.
131. See REPORT OF BRITISH DELEGATES AT THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME
CONFERENCE HELD AT BRUSSELS ON THE 17TH-26TH OCTOBER, 1922, p. 23 (1923) :
"This is a new article. Under it the Convention applies to all bills of lading issued
in any of the Contracting States. It was explained that we would only accept
the article on condition that it is authoritatively explained in the "Report" of the
Conference as only applying to bills of lading in which a national of a foreign state
is interested and not to cases in which (for example) all the parties are British."
132. See Dubosc, De la loi applicable au contrat de transport maritime, [1951]
D.M.F. 214; PLAISANT, LES RkGLES DE CONFLIT DE LOIS DANS LES TRAITIIS 13,
275 (1946) ; 2 RIPERT, DROIT MARITIME 803 (1929 ed.) (Art. X established a
rule "traditionally known in France," namely, that the law of the place of contract-
ing governs. See also 2 FRANKENSTEIN, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 513, n.
61 (1934); 3 RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 265
(1950). At least by implication, Art. X of the Brussels Convention was con-
sidered as establishing a choice of law rule in the recent works of the Sub-Com-
mittee on Conflict of Laws of the Comit6 Maritime Internationale. All three
resolutions for a new convention designed to regulate conflict of laws with regard
to international carriage of goods left intact the Brussels Convention. See note
63 supra; Stbdter, supra note 108 at 222.
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the law of the forum.183  Further, it has been observed that Ar-
ticle X refers to the application of "this Convention" rather than
to national legislation.
13 4
In a recent publication, Professor Stodter of Hamburg sug-
gested that Article X must be disregarded completely as devoid
of meaning. 135 The argument runs as follows: Article X desig-
nates as applicable law the convention itself and not a certain
national law; it was obviously adopted on the assumption that
the convention would become part of the law of the land in the
contracting states by direct promulgation. 13 6 However, as sev-
eral countries were not prepared to sacrifice their national poli-
cies for the sake of international uniformity beyond a certain
point, the Protocol of Signature was adopted. But, by granting
an option to the contracting states to regard the convention as a
model for domestic legislation, the Protocol of Signature de-
stroyed the very assumption on which Article X rested. Accord-
ing to Professor Stodter, Article X and its reference to the "pro-
visions of this Convention" would have a meaning only if the
convention were to be adopted in its entirety; under the circum-
stances, no other meaning can be given to it.1'3
It is submitted that the Protocol of Signature is not irrecon-
cilable with Article X. Actually, it is a reasonable interpreta-
tion that the option granted by the Protocol of Signature should
be read in the light of, and should include, Article X. Accord-
ingly, it is suggested that the contracting states, in case they
chose to take advantage of the Protocol of Signature, they were
still under an international obligation to enact Article X itself
in a "form appropriate" to their national legislation. A corre-
sponding provision of domestic law should read: "The provisions
of this statute shall apply to all bills of lading issued in the ter-
ritory of any of the contracting states." Thus, states promulgat-
133. See St~dter, Zur Statutenkollision im Seefrachtvertrag, in LIBER AMI-
CORUM OF CONGRATULATIONS TO ALGOT BAGGE 226, 230 (1955). According to
Stbdter, this is the prevailing doctrine in Great Britain and in the commonwealth
in general. Ibid.
134. See Convention, Art. X, text at note 102 supra; Stidter, supra note 133,
at 224. See also GRAMM, DAS NEUE DEUTSCHE SEEFRACHTRECIET NACH DEN
HAAoER REGELN 77, n. 7 (1938).
135. See Stbdter, Zur Statutenkollision im Seefrachtvertrag, in LIBER AMI-
COBUM OF CONGRATULATIONS TO ALGOT BAGGE 220, 230 (1955).
136. Ibid. In the same sense, see GUYON, LES TRANSPORTS RtGIS PAR LA LOI
DU 2 AVRIL 1936, p. 18 (1959).
137. Thus, according to Professor St6dter the only possible solution is the
adoption of a new Convention designed to regulate problems of conflict of laws.
Id. at 230. Cf. note 63 supra.
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ing the convention as such would apply its provisions to all bills
of lading issued in the territory of any of the contracting states
while states enacting domestic legislation would apply it (as
forum law) to precisely the same bills of lading.
For the reasons stated, Article X cannot be regarded as an
intergovernmental promise or as a choice of law rule establish-
ing application of the law of the place of contracting. Nor can
it be completely disregarded. It is submitted, therefore, that the
famous article is nothing more than a clause delimiting the area
of application of the uniform rules, as conventional or as do-
mestic law. 8 Such clauses are termed in the continental litera-
ture "unilateral conflicts norms."'' 9 The situation is thus not
different from the case where, at the end of a statute, a clause is
appended defining its area of application. 140 The courts in such
cases are expected to apply the statute in accordance with the
specified contacts and without reference to the general conflicts
rules, which, ordinarily, operate "bilaterally.' 4' Originally it
was thought that the convention itself would be given the force
of law and thus according to Article X the uniform rules would
apply to all bills of lading issued in the territory of any of the
contracting states. When the Protocol of Signature was adopted,
and the contracting states were given the option to enact legis-
lation in an appropriate form, the situation did not change. Ar-
ticle X, transformed into domestic law, would still operate as a
unilateral choice of law rule of the forum.
42
Relying on conflicting interpretations of Article X, and on
varying conceptions with regard to the juridical nature of con-
ventions for uniform law, 43 legislators, courts, and writers in
various contracting states have taken opposite and conflicting
views with regard to the scope of the intended unification. Ac-
138. A rule delimiting the area of application "indicates that the enactment
in question only applies to acts connected with the territory of the enacting legis-
lature in a particular way." See Morris, The Choice of Law Clauses in Statutes,
62 L.Q. REV. 170, 172 (1946). Cf. text at note 111 supra.
139. See WIETHULTER, EINSEITIGE KOLLISIONSNORMEN ALS GRUNDLAGE DES
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS (1956). Professor Nussbaum calls the latter
"spatially conditioned internal rules." PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAw 71 (1943).
140. For purposes of conflict of laws, statutes may be divided in three cate-
gories: (1) those with no choice of law clause at all; (2) those with a bilateral
choice of law clause; and (3) those with a unilateral clause purporting to delimit
the scope of the domestic law. See Morris, The Choice of Law Clauses in Stat-
utes, 62 L.Q. REV. 170 (1946).
141. See Morris, supra note 140.
142. See text at note 138 supra.
143. See text at note 49 et 8eq. supra.
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cordingly, it has been suggested that the convention was de-
signed to unify substantive rules of law only, both substantive
and conflicts rules, to introduce special legislation applicable to
international bills of lading or to both international and domestic
bills of lading.
According to one line of thought, the purpose of the Brussels
Convention was to unify only the substantive law of the contract-
ing states with regard to the regulation of bills of lading.144 This
conclusion is reached by interpreting Article X as a promise to
introduce Articles I to VIII of the convention as domestic law.145
In such a case, each country is free to delimit the application of
the uniform (forum) law and to adopt choice of law rules gov-
erning all transactions outside the scope of the forum law.148 If
all contracting states had adopted this interpretation, the uni-
form rules would apply in accordance with the prevailing con-
flicts rules, differing with the forum; and uniformity could be
achieved only as to contracts localized in one of the contracting
states.
Further, it has been pointed out that the Brussels Convention
was designed to make uniform both the substantive law of the
contracting states and their conflicts rules governing bills of lad-
ing. 47 This view seems to be based on an implied promise to
enact as domestic law Articles I to X of the convention while
Article X is regarded at the same time as a choice of law rule
establishing applicability of the law of the place of contract-
ing.148 It follows that, in such a case, the contracting states
would not be free to adopt conflicts rules of their choice. 49 If
this view were generally adopted, courts sitting in signatory
states would apply the uniform rules as law of the place of con-
tracting to all bills of lading issued in any of these states; bills
of lading issued in the forum state would be subject to the forum
law and bills issued in other contracting states would be subject
to the uniform rules as incorporated and interpreted in those
144. Of. CARVER, CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT 207 (1952) ; note 129 supra.
145. See text at note 129 supra.
146. Of. Diena, Principes du droit international privd maritime, [19351
A.D.I.R.C. 409, 414; 1 RIPERT, DOIT MARITIME 72, 73 (1950).
147. See Algot Bagge, Motives of the First Draft Resolution p. 15, Comit6
Maritime International, International Sub-Committee on Conflict of Laws, Minutes
of the Brighton Meeting (Sept. 21, 1954) ; Stbdter, supra note 108, at 222. See
also text at note 132 supra.
148. See text at note 132 et seq. supra. According to Stbdter, supra note 108,
at 226, this is the prevailing doctrine in France and in the Scandinavian countries.
149. Cf. text at note 116 supra; Diena, supra note 146, at 414.
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states. Bills of lading issued in non-signatory states would be
governed by the law of these states and, normally, the uniform
rules would not apply. Finally, courts sitting in non-signatory
countries would also apply the uniform rules to bills of lading
localized in a country adhering to the convention.
The prevailing opinion, at least among continental scholars,
is that the Brussels Convention was designed to eliminate both
conflicts and choice of law.150 Yet, there is a sharp division of
opinion as some writers suggest that the convention was intend-
ed to apply to international bills of lading only, while others
declare that its purpose was to cover both domestic and interna-
tional bills of lading.
Several writers, relying on the Protocol of Signature 5' and
on the reservation filed by the delegate of Japan with regard to
domestic trade,15 2 suggest that the Brussels Convention intended
to make uniform the law applied to international bills of lading
alone.153 This view is supported, further, by the practice fol-
150. See AUBRUN, LES TRANSPORTS DE MARC]HANDISES PAR MER 129 (1938) ;
SAUVAGE, LA TItOISLATION NOUVELLE SUR LES TRANSPORTS MARITIMES DE MAR-
CIIANDISES 129 (1937). Cf. Expos6 de Motifs, Chambre, Annex No. 719 p. 32.
151. See Protocol of Signature § 2: [The High Contracting Parties may reserve
the right - -] "To apply Article 6 insofar as the national coasting trade is con-
cerned to all classes of goods without account of the restrictions set out in the last
paragraph of that article." This section figured already in the Protocol of Signa-
ture prepared by the Sub-Committee of the 1923 Brussels Conference. See COMITt
MARITIME INTERNATIONAL, Bulletin No. 65 (Conference of Gothemburg) 420, 434
(1923). On the history and interpretation of the Protocol of Signature, see Ripert,
La Commission de Bruxelles, [1923] IV REV. DOR. 55, 57, 58. The Protocol of
Signature has not exempted from the uniform rules the coastal trade as a whole,
but only certain shipments and under certain circumstances. Yet, it has been
interpreted as allowing legislative freedom to the contracting states with regard
to bills of lading involving exclusively domestic contacts, and with regard to the
entire domestic trade as such!
152. See note attached to the letter of August 25, 1925 from his Excellence
the Japanese Ambassador to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs: "(b) Japan
is of opinion that the Convention, as a whole, does not apply to the national
coasting trade, and consequently there is no need to make it the object of a pro-
vision in the Protocol. At the same time, if this is not the case, Japan reserves
the right to provide freely for the national coasting trade by its own legislation."
See CARVER, op. cit. 8upra note 144, at 1085.
153. See SciERRER, op. cit. supra note 13, at 33; SCHNITZER, op. cit. supra
note 14, at 33; Ripert, La loi frangaise du 2 avril 1936 sur le transport des mar-
chandises par mer, [1936] RIv. DiR. NAV. 367, 368; Prodromides, Champs d'appli-
cation respectifs de la Convention de Bruxelles du 25 a6ut 1924 sur les connaisse-
ments et de la loi du 2 avril 1936, [1956] D.M.F. 123, 124; Limpens, Les con-
stantes de l'unification du droit privd, [1958] REv. INT. DR. Comp. 277, 288;
Levebre d'Ovidio, Legge nazionali e responsabilit degli armatori, [1940] I Riv.
DIR. NAV. 285, 300-302; POPNCES DE LA PLESSE, LE PROBLPME DE L'UNIFICATION
DIU DROIT COMMERCIAL MARITIME 197 (1932). Cf. W5STEND6RFER, NEUZEITLICHES
SEEIIANDELSRECHT 31 (1950) ; Malintoppi, Diritto uniforme e diritto internazio-
nale privato in tama di transporto 118-129, in UNIVERSITA DEOLI STUDI DI CAME-
RINO, ANNALI DELLA FACOLTk GIURIDICA (1955).
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lowed in a number of other international conventions for uni-
form law, and by the consideration that the high contracting
parties had a justifiable interest only in the uniform regulation
of international bills of lading. This limited purpose could be
achieved by subjecting all such bills of lading to a substantive
regulation which would be the same everywhere, and which
would govern without reference to choice of law rules. However,
the suggested interpretation conflicts with the language of Ar-
ticle X; and unless that article is disregarded this view cannot
be accepted. Moreover, there is nothing in the convention indi-
cating which bills of lading are "domestic" and which "interna-
tional," nor agreement among scholars as to the criteria for such
a distinction.154 Nevertheless, had all countries adhered to this
view, "international" uniformity would have been achieved in a
large number of cases. Courts sitting in a signatory country
would apply the uniform rules to all "international" bills of lad-
ing issued in the territory of any contracting state, including
that of the forum state. Domestic bills of lading, and bills of
lading issued in non-signatory countries, would be subject to the
governing law in accordance with the conflicts rules of the
forum. Finally, courts sitting in non-signatory countries would
apply the uniform rules to international bills of lading localized
in one of the signatory countries.
It is submitted that the Brussels Convention was designed to
make uniform the law applied to bills of lading involving both
domestic and international contacts. 1 5 The literal meaning of
Article X is that the rules adopted in the Brussels Convention
should apply to all bills of lading (regulated by the convention)
issued in any of the contracting states. Applied as such, or trans-
formed into domestic law, Article X would import the uniform
rules, irrespective of all other contacts, to all bills of lading is-
sued in the forum state or in any other contracting state.'56 In
this sense, Article X is not a choice of law rule providing for
application of the law of the place of contracting, nor a promise
to incorporate Articles I to VIII of the convention into domestic
law, but a rule delimiting the application of a body of uniform
154. Of. Yiannopoulos, supra note 17, at 522.
155. In this sense see also Pergeroux, L'introduction en France des conven-
tions sur l'unification du droit maritime, [1936] ANN. DR. CoMI. 216; Berlingieri,
La convenzione di Bruxelles sulla polizza di carico ed il codice della navigazione,
[1952] DIR. MAR. 489, 500-502; COLE, THE HAGUE RULES EXPLAINED 2, 4
(1924) ; HOSNER, LA RESPONSABILITP DU TRANSPORTEUR MARITIME 17-18 (1956) ;
and MARKIANOS 32 et seq. advancing dogmatic, historical, and policy arguments.
156. Of. text at note 142 supra.
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substantive rules to both domestic and international bills of lad-
ing. Actually, there is nothing revolutionary in this view; sev-
eral other conventions paved the way as it became increasingly
apparent that it may be both unfair and impractical to permit
the parallel operation of two distinct legal orders, one for do-
mestic and the other for international transactions. 157
Thus, in spite of theoretical efforts designed to justify the
retention of a national legislation parallel to the uniform regu-
lation, 1 it seems that Article X established in simple and clear
terms a uniform regime for both domestic and international bills
of lading. The only relevant contact for application of the uni-
form rules is the place of issue of the bill of lading in a contract-
ing state; as to such bills of lading differences among national
legislations are swept away. Thus, only bills of lading not cov-
ered by the convention or bills of lading issued in non-contract-
ing states might still be subject to national substantive regula-
tion and to national conflicts rules, as any other transaction in-
volving international contacts. If all contracting states had fol-
lowed this interpretation, a court sitting in any of these states
would apply the uniform rules (as incorporated in the forum
state) to all bills of lading issued in any contracting state (in-
cluding the forum) regardless of all other contacts. The same
courts would be free to apply other than uniform law to bills of
lading not covered by the convention, or to those issued in non-
contracting states; as to such bills of lading not only substantive
law but also choice of law rules could differ with the forum. On
the other hand, courts sitting in non-contracting states would
apply the law referred to by their conflicts rules; and the uni-
form rules would still apply to bills of lading localized in a con-
tracting state.
CONCLUSIONS
Doctrinal conflicts of opinions concerning binding force,
scope of unification, and juridical nature of conventions for uni-
form law in general are reflected in efforts at interpretation of
the Brussels Convention on Bills of Lading. In that regard, our
own analysis of the text of the convention in the light of inter-
national theory and practice, has led to the following conclu-
sions:
157. See 1 RIPERT, DROIT MARITIME 72 (1950) ("A country has no excuse in
refusing to adopt as national law what it has already adopted as international
law). See also id., [1923] II REV. DOR. 65.
158. Cf. text at note 135 et seq. supra.
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1. In the absence of reservation to the contrary, the several
contracting states assumed an international obligation to give
the force of law within their territories to Articles I to X of the
convention. The convention is not directly applicable in national
courts by virtue of a rule of international law; its municipal ef-
fects depend on rules of national constitutional law.
2. Neither international law nor the text of the Brussels
Convention offer conclusive answers as to its juridical nature.
The answer to this question Will also depend on accepted doc-
trines concerning international law and on the positive law of
each country.
3. Concerning the intended scope of unification, it has been
shown that the purpose of the Brussels Convention was to make
uniform both substantive and choice of law rules governing in-
ternational and domestic carriage of goods by sea-going vessels
under bills of lading.
4. Finally, with regard to the expected effects of unifica-
tion on conflict of laws problems, it has been shown that the
Brussels Convention was intended to eliminate, as between con-
tracting states, conflicts of both substantive and choice of law
rules. It was hoped that (1) by making uniform the substantive
rules applied to bills of lading (Articles I to VIII), and (2) by
imposing a uniform delimitation of these rules (Article X), the
outcome of a possible litigation would be the same in the courts
of any of the contracting states. And this would be so whether
the convention was regarded as international legislation or as a
model for domestic legislation, or whether it was to be given the
force of law in its entirety or in a form appropriate to the na-
tional legislation of the contracting states.
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